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Abstract
Within the American criminal legal system, it is a well-established practice to presume
the innocence of those charged with criminal offenses unless proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such a judicial framework-like approach, called a legal maxim, is utilized in
order to ensure that the law is applied and interpreted in ways that legislative bodies intended.
The central aim of this piece in relation to the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution is to investigate whether the Supreme Court of the United States has utilized a
specific legal maxim within cases that dispute government speech or expression regulation.
Specifically, this research addresses the following central question: Has the Supreme Court of
the United States, within certain notable cases that dispute the regulation of speech or
expression, employed a legal maxim which grants initial preference or leverage to the First
Amendment’s interest in protecting and preserving it over the State’s interest in regulating it?
To answer this question, I will first briefly overview the tests and reasoning employed by
the Court’s majority within certain landmark cases under six major subcategories of speech or
expression. Then, if applicable, I will identify the existence of such a legal maxim within. Lastly, I
will address the implications of employing such a judicial framework to these disputes.
My findings confirm the Court’s general utilization of this legal maxim. My analyses
show that within the simple majority of the highlighted cases below, the Court has, in practice,
employed a technical approach which gives an initial preference of interest to the
Constitution’s protection of speech and expression over the State’s interest in regulation.
Key terms: Speech, Expression, First Amendment, Precedent, Doctrine, Legal Maxim, Supreme Court, Constitution,
Political Science, Democracy.
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Self-Determination in American Discourse: The Supreme Court’s Historical Indoctrination of
Free Speech and Expression

Introduction
I.

Context
A. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution, firmly established at the

forefront of the Bill of Rights, is written as follows:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

This clause, along with its intrinsic shielding of free speech and expression, has arguably
been the most salient out of all twenty-seven Amendments. The importance of its holistic role
in preserving the democratic liberties that American citizens enjoy on a widespread basis each
day is nearly impossible to overstate (Zhang 3).

B. Issues of Ambiguity.
The First Amendment’s generally unclear meaning and application is unsurprisingly
highly contested to this day. This lack of understanding is a shared quality held by most clauses
within the Bill of Rights. Because of this lack of clarity, the aggregate of legal cases that
challenge or dispute its interpretation takes the number one position on the list of the largest
categories of disputes heard by the Supreme Court in both the 20th and 21st century (Zhang).
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The First Amendment’s ambiguity and its unclear method of application is the driving reason for
why this inquiry is necessary.
“The ideas in the First Amendment are perennial. As long as speech, religion, and the press exist, they
will continue to evolve. As time passes, new disputes involving them that have never been encountered
before will appear and be challenged in the courts.” - Benjamin Zhang, Duke University

While it holds true that the Bill of Rights was first established as an undissolvable layer
of protection between the civil liberties of American citizens and government encroachment,
the actual method of applying of this concept through the Court’s process of judicial review
holds no promises and is not defined in clear-cut or directive terms. Therefore, though we
would hope to find a legal maxim within all of these cases that gives an initial preference of
interest to speech and expression liberties over government regulation of such, the Supreme
Court’s indoctrination of such a legal maxim is discretionary in nature and is therefore not
guaranteed.

C. Significance.
Though nearly all aspects of the Constitution have played their own individual roles in
ensuring the survival of our great American experiment, freedom of thought and the
guaranteed right to express and exchange ideas with others is its primary backbone. Many of
the most prominent social and political philosophers in history that have had direct influence
upon the underpinnings of the Constitution - such as Aristotle, Mill, Locke, and Milton, to name
a few - emphasize the irreplaceable role of this liberty. And, as predicted, nearly all of the
features of our constitutional representative republic - including our legislative, judicial, and
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electoral affairs - hinge on the ability to express ideas in order to continue the process of
productive evolution within our social and governmental interactive systems. These political
systems are filled with rational actors; they are “not indeterminate, chaotic, or arbitrary; (they
are) connected to human nature, to the grand question raised by human nature, and to the
choice we make in the exercise of our natural capacity for choice. That capacity depends on the
speech with which we form and state a choice” (Mansfield). As time goes on, changes are
necessary, but these changes would likely not occur sans the First Amendment.
Because of 1) the enormously important role that free speech and expression play in the
effective functioning of all democratic-esque governments, 2) the inherent ambiguity of the
First Amendment, and 3) the Supreme Court’s unique power of judicial review in overseeing
these disputes established in Marbury, the Court has seen a massive number of related cases
appealed to their jurisdiction.

D. Speech and Expression.
Free speech and expression, loosely defined, is the groupings of ideas or thoughts that
individuals can outwardly and physically convey to others that fall under protections extended
by the First Amendment and are immune from State regulation. On the contrary, speech or
expression that is not considered free are the ideas and thoughts in which the protection status
of their outward physical communication has been actively struck down by the Supreme Court
in the past and are therefore subject to State regulation. Examples include the “distribution of
obscene materials” (Roth v. United States, 1957) and “the incitement of actions that would
harm others” (Schenck v. United States, 1919).
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Neither speech nor expression is limited to only verbal forms. They can vary greatly
from simple verbatim, such as flag desecration (Texas v. Johnson, 1989) or the destruction of
draft cards (United States v. O’Brien, 1968).

E. Legal Maxims In the Context of Constitutional Disputes
Maxims, put simply, are commonly accepted frameworks of reasoning and
consideration that are utilized in order to introduce some aspect of predictability or uniformity
under certain circumstances. This broadly used Latin term is not only applicable to legal
philosophy but also to matters of social and public interactive behavior. In the eyes of
Immanuel Kant, prominent 18th century German social and political philosopher, a maxim is “a
subjective principle of action”. It can be considered, in the modern sense, to be synonymous
with the term “norm”. In the term’s application to the United States Constitution within this
research, maxims will be considered “statements of rules that establish the baseline for legal
justification…(they are a) foundation of legal authority...(that sets) a baseline for legitimate
restraints and powers” (Tsesis 1614).

II.

Methodology
In order to answer the central question above, my unit of analysis is the aggregate of

reasonings and tests that are employed within the written majority decisions of certain
landmark Supreme Court cases that together as a whole make up the six major subcategories of
speech and expression that will be investigated. The existence of a preferential pattern within

5
these cases and subsequent doctrines will allow me to determine if such a legal maxim has
often been utilized by Justices within speech or expression regulation disputes as a whole.
My hypothesis is that, within the majority of the analyzed cases, the Supreme Court of
the United States has in fact chosen to employ a legal maxim which grants initial preference or
sponsorship to the protection of the speech or expression in question and also initially places
the State’s attempted regulation into a disadvantageous offensive position in which it holds the
burden of meeting a specific (though varying) standard of interest.

III.

Related Research
There exist numerous studies of broader constitutional maxims, similar to that of

Alexander Tsesis’ cited above. Such studies highlight evidence of general maxims that
encompass the entirety of the Constitution. However, there exists very little research on more
narrow maxims that have been utilized by the Supreme Court, specifically within disputes of
speech or expression regulation.
This research also differs from most other studies on the First Amendment, which are
often anecdotal and tend to focus upon a narrow range of speech or expression. This study
does not utilize all applicable cases, but instead focuses on a select number of key suits within
each category in order to give a more holistic and generally informative viewpoint on a central
aspect of how the Court has approached cases of State speech or expression regulation.
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The Search For a Legal Maxim

I.

Freedom of the Press
In the case of Near v. Minnesota (1931), the Court determined that Minnesota’s Public

Nuisance Law, which provided permanent injunction against those involved with the publishing
or selling of "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper(s)”, was in violation of the First
Amendment’s freedom of the press clause in a narrow 5-4 decision (Oyez). The reasoning
within the majority decision by Chief Justice Hughes shows that, under this specific
circumstance of prior restraint, Minnesota’s restriction of these publications did not pass strict
scrutiny. Minnesota’s interest in restriction also did not fall under any categories of prior
restraint that did manage previously to meet this bar, such as cases of obscene material or
publications that advocate for the violent overthrow of the government (Feldman 444).
A second groundbreaking case on matters of the press, New York Times v. United States
(1971), took place during the heat of the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War. This case,
which also dealt with prior restraint by the State, demanded that the Court assess the
constitutionality of President Nixon’s citing of the Espionage Act in his attempts to stop the
publication of what was known as the “Pentagon Papers” by the New York Times Company.
President Nixon argued that these documents contained classified information that could
compromise national security. Ultimately, on a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that the restraint
was unconstitutional. More specifically, the Per Curiam opinion stated “Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
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constitutional validity...the Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the enforcement of such a restraint” (Feldman 447).
Within each of these cases, both playing a large role in creating the foundational
precedent for future limits on restrictions of speech or expression of the press, the Court can
clearly be seen utilizing a legal maxim in which the government’s interests in restriction were
immediately placed up against a large burdening hurdle, forcing it to meet a certain standard
under strict scrutiny. Meanwhile, the speech in question in both cases clearly entered each
dispute in preferential positions, underscored by the written opinion in New York Times (1971).

II.

Freedom of Religion and Associative Speech
In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court was asked to determine the constitutional

validity of a Wisconsin law that mandated that all children under the age of sixteen be sent
through universal education programs. Ultimately, three Amish parents were prosecuted under
this law after refraining from sending their children to such schools for “religious reasons”. In a
7-2 decision in favor of the defendants, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “a State’s interest in
universal education must be strictly scrutinized when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests”. In other words, Burger held that a “compelling government interest” must be
identified in order for the State to rightfully suppress speech or expression. Furthermore, the
Court held that “(the State could not prevail unless it showed that its requirement) served a
State interest of sufficient magnitude to override the free exercise claim” (Feldman 656).
Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), a very recent and
very highly debated case, also dealt with a State’s restriction of an individual’s religious
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expression. This case asked the Court to determine the legality of a Colorado antidiscrimination law under which a private business owner was prosecuted for refusing his
services due to a conflict of interest between his religious views and the sexual orientation of
the two customers who were recently granted government permission to be married to one
another through the Court’s decision in the earlier case of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). In a
difficult-to-interpret barrage of concurring and dissenting opinions that ultimately heeded to a
7-2 holding in favor of the business owner’s right to religious expression, the Court ultimately
struck down Colorado’s law by outweighing the individual’s right to such a freedom over
Colorado’s interest in suppressing the expression to ensure equal access to goods and services
for the protected class of homosexual individuals. The reasoning employed by Justice Kennedy
in the majority decision, which is a bit more difficult to parse through in comparison to the
reasoning of Yoder (1972), focused on his viewpoint that the CCRC gave unfair “hostile
treatment” to the business owner rather than vice versa against the “protected” class of
customers (Feldman 646).
In the case of Yoder (1972), the majority of the Court, in clear and direct terms,
reasoned that the State’s interest in the regulation of religious expression often enters the
courtroom immediately carrying a burden of proof, and that the religious expression shown by
Yoder was a “fundamental right” that could hardly ever be suppressed by the State in a valid
way. This reasoning most certainly conforms to the hypothesized “preferential” legal maxim
that we are aiming to identify. However, in the case of Masterpiece Cake Shop (2018), the
weighing of interests appears much narrower and more muddled in that no two Justices used
the same weighing basis. Each Justice that wrote a concurring or dissenting opinion focused on
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different contextual considerations or facts of the dispute. Because of this, the reasoning
employed by the Justices was far from uniform in comparison to cases in which a greater
proportion of the Court concurs in full with the written majority opinion. Though the decision
ultimately upheld the religious expression over the State’s restriction of it, the varying
independent reasonings within clearly lacked the usage of a legal maxim which initially weighed
the religious expression over the State’s interests.

III.

Symbolic and Demonstrative Speech
Five years after Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag in front of the Dallas City

Hall to protest the Reagan administration, the case of Texas v. Johnson (1989) was presented.
This case, an example of nonverbal expression, asked the Court to determine the
constitutionality of a Texas law that, at the time, made such desecration of the American flag a
punishable crime. In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court struck down the Texas law and Johnson’s
conviction. Justice Brennan’s written majority decision reasoned that Johnson’s actions fell
under a category of expression called “expressive conduct”, and that while some may be
offended by Johnson’s actions, that alone does not deem the expressive conduct as subject to
government regulation. On the contrary, Brennan held that Texas, in order for its law to be
upheld, must prove that its interest in regulation, which was to “preserve the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity”, justified Johnson’s conviction (Feldman 256). Ultimately, the
Court found that Texas lacked this justification, and that its remaining allegation of
“offensiveness” was lacking, as the State did not have the right to regulate or restrict speech or
expression based on its level of disagreeability. The Court, in this case, clearly employed a legal
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maxim which set a burdening standard of interest that the State of Texas had to prove that it
met in order for its restrictions to be upheld. Meanwhile, Johnson’s “expressive conduct” was
not faced with any burden of proof or standard that it had to meet.
A second case within this category of expression, Adderley v. Florida (1966), was
presented to the Court after a large group of Florida A&M students peacefully demonstrated
against “racist motives” that led to the previous jailing of fellow A&M students. This
demonstration, which resulted in the Sheriff’s department arresting thirty-two of the
individuals for trespassing, took place on the physical property of the jail that they were
protesting. This case asked the Court to determine the legitimacy of the arrests and charges. In
a 5-4 decision, it held that they were justified. Justice Black, writing for the majority, made two
key considerations. First, Black reasoned that the Sheriffs’ arrests of the students were made in
order to preserve the integrity of the jail property, and that “the Constitution does not forbid a
State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose”.
Secondly, Black contended that the actions of the Sheriff and his deputies came as a result of a
legitimate concern for the security of the jail, and that there was “not a shred” of evidence that
the arrests were made because of the content of the expression (Feldman 319). The Court’s
approach to this case, which ultimately upheld the State’s interest in regulating the expression
in question, appears to not have granted such an initial preference to the petitioning civilian
party, as Black and the majority did not exert a burden of proof upon the State, but rather
clearly identified its right of controlling its own property and extended that right to support
certain cases of expression restriction.
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IV.

Situational Expression: School and Work Settings
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) is considered to be

one of the most groundbreaking cases to have ever been argued in front of the Supreme Court
of the United States. This case addressed a situation in which a group of students were
threatened with suspension and then sent home for an extended period of time after refusing
to remove their black armbands that were being worn as a form of protest against the
continuation of the Vietnam War. In a 7-2 decision, the Court deemed the school’s actions
unconstitutional. Justice Fortas’ majority opinion reasoned that students do not lose their right
to free speech upon entering school properties; subsequently, in order for the school’s (the
State actor in this case) suppression to be upheld, it must “prove that the conduct in question
would materially and substantially interfere" with the learning environment that it has vested
interest in maintaining (Feldman 360). However, because the school’s actions came as a result
of it wanting to stop the mere potential for disruption or distraction, it did not meet this
standard. Student speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others”, however, is subject to restriction (Feldman 360).
Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), a case of disputed speech in the workplace,
asked the Court to determine the constitutional basis of a schoolteacher’s firing after he wrote
a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing the school district’s (his employer) handling
of funds and his perception of it prioritizing athletic interests over academic interests. In an 8-1
decision, the Court determined that Pickering’s letter was a protected form of speech, and that
his firing was unconstitutional. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, established two bases
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of reasoning for cases of workplace speech suppression. First, Marshall struck down the notion
that public employees give up constitutional liberties when entering employment. Second, and
more importantly, Marshall also established the “Pickering Review” (Feldman 372), which as
itself is a type of legal maxim, holding that topics of public interest generally fall under the
category of protected speech or expression unless a compelling government interest proves
otherwise. Because the subject matter of Pickering’s letter was of public interest and because
employees do not shed their civil liberties when entering employment, the speech was
protected and the firing was unconstitutional.
There is clear evidence that the Court used “free speech preferring” legal maxims within
both Tinker (1969) and Pickering (1968). The Court’s initial approach in Tinker almost
immediately struck down the State’s interest in regulating student speech by A) holding that
students do not automatically shed their rights to free expression when entering school and by
B) placing the State in a burdensome position in which it must prove that the expression will
materially interfere with the school’s learning environment. Marshall’s Pickering Review in the
latter case shows even stronger evidence of the Court’s usage of this type of maxim as this
approach effectively established conditions in which nearly any matter of public concern within
any context could be automatically protected from any form of restriction, giving the State a
nearly insurmountable standard to meet without a compelling interest.

V.

Seditious and Revolutionary Speech
The Court’s reasoning in Schenck v. United States (1919) established a new case

approach called the “clear and present danger test”. This approach, also known as the Holmes-
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Brandeis Doctrine, established a weighing mechanism in which the State’s interest in restricting
speech or expression would be upheld if such material posed a “clear and present danger”,
which included protecting against vulnerabilities of national interests. In this case, which took
place in the heat of WWI, two American scientists distributed leaflets that urged for the
disobedience of the wartime draft by those who were called to serve, arguing that the wartime
draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections against involuntary servitude. One of
the scientists was charged with the conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. In a striking
unanimous vote, the Court reasoned that the Espionage Act and Schenck’s conviction did not
violate the First Amendment. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found that due to the
gravity of special interests of national security and integrity in times of war, courts must hold a
higher defense standard of the government in such cases, even when civil liberties are at stake
within the opposition. This effectively created the “clear and present danger test” highlighted
above. Under these circumstances, Justice Holmes found that the leaflets posed a “clear and
present danger brought upon by a significant evil” that was “reasonably likely” to cause
disruption (Feldman 17). Therefore, the speech was outweighed by the State’s wartime
interests and was not granted protection under the First Amendment.
In Dennis v. United States (1951), the Court was tasked with determining the
constitutionality of the Smith Act. The Smith Act, which made it a punishable crime to advocate
for the “violent overthrow” of the government, allowed eleven individuals that held public
positions within the Communist Party of the United States to be criminally charged. The
petitioners argued that the Smith Act violated their right to free speech by “stifling open
discussion about the merits of Marxism and Leninism”. In a 6-2 decision, the Court upheld the
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Smith Act and the charges against the eleven individuals. The reasoning within the Court’s
plurality opinion, delivered by Justice Vinson and joined by Justices Reed, Burton and Minton,
found that the Smith Act was not in violation of the First Amendment because the Act and the
subsequent criminal charges were in place to halt the possibility of a violent government
overthrow, which posed a “clear and probable danger” at the time. The Court found that the
Smith Act and the charges in question were not in any way used to stifle open discussion about
political ideas, but rather to target the potential dangers that could come as a result of the
speech made by the eleven Communist Party members (Feldman 40).
The multitude of cases in which the Court repeatedly uses the clear and present (or
“probable”) danger test first established in Schenck (1919) highlights a recurrent maxim in
which the speech in question is not given a preferential standing over the State’s reasoning to
regulate it. Conversely, these cases show a turning of the tide in which the special interests of
the State are given initial preference. As Justice Holmes writes in Schenck, “the character of
every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done...the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a
right to prevent” (Feldman 18). To be granted protection under this test, the speech in question
is burdened with proving that it does not pose such a danger.

VI.

Threatening, Violent, and Intimidating Speech
In the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court was in charge of assessing the

constitutionality of Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism law after a local Klu Klux Klan leader was
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criminally charged for making a speech at a Klan rally. This Ohio law deemed all actions that
advocated "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform" as punishable offenses as well as abolishing group
gatherings “with any society or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism”. In a Per Curiam decision, the Court ruled that Ohio’s Criminal
Syndicalism law was in violation of the First Amendment under a newly developed “imminent
lawless action” test, a two-pronged weighing mechanism in which the State’s interest must
pass two considerations in order for its regulation to be upheld. First, the speech it aims to
restrict must be “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and it must also be
“likely to produce such action”. Conversely, speech that does not immediately incite such
action is protected from regulation (Feldman 48). After applying the test, the Court reasoned
that because Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism law did not take into consideration whether or not
speech would actually incite any violent acts and instead restricted all forms of applicable
speech, it did not pass the test and was therefore unconstitutional.
Virginia v. Black (2003), a more modern case, dealt with State regulation of intimidating
speech after three individuals were found guilty under a Virginia statute that outlawed any
cross-burning done “with intent to intimidate”. The Court’s primary point of focus within this
statute was a specific clause, which stated “any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons”. In a 7-2 decision, the Court
found that the Virginia statute was in violation of the First Amendment. The reasoning within
Justice O’Connor’s majority decision saw the law as being overly broad due to the wording of
the statute, as any and all cross-burning would act as “prima facie evidence” of intent to
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intimidate. The law would, in practice, make any cross-burning under any circumstance a class
six felony. The statute effectively placed the burden of proof upon the alleged to prove that
they did not have an intent to intimidate, creating a fundamental conflict from a judicial
standpoint. Because of its overly broad nature, the Court also concluded that it could have the
tendency to chill constitutionally-protected speech for fear of one’s actions automatically
becoming evidence of their intent, regardless of their actual motives (Feldman 119). Ultimately,
this case indoctrinated the idea that the State could not make the expression of unpopular
views automatically illegal, and that speech could not be banned merely because it expresses
ideas that offend.
Brandenburg’s (1969) imminent lawless action test is one of the most clear-cut
examples of the Court utilizing a case approach similar to what this research sets out to
identify. By placing the State’s interest in regulation through a stringent two-pronged test, it
effectively placed the party representing the expression itself in a very advantageous and
preferential legal position. In order to pass this test under strict scrutiny, the State would have
to prove that the law in question was created to restrict speech under very narrow and specific
circumstances.
On the contrary, Justice O’Connor’s approach in Virginia (2003) does not appear to
utilize a maxim that would have given initial preference to the constitutional interests of
protecting the expression in question over Virginia’s interest in regulating it. However, by
striking down the statute’s “prima facie” clause, it does show the Court revering the legal
maxim of “innocent until proven guilty” and using it as a standard principle that all State laws
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must adhere to. As one of the most firmly established and deeply rooted judicial approaches in
democratized legal systems, the Court’s homage comes without surprise.
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Summary of Findings

My findings indicate that, within the simple majority of the speech and expression
categories analyzed in this research, when approaching a case that pertains to the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has taken the initial stance that the speech and/or expression
in question is automatically protected unless it A) falls within a category that has already been
deemed unprotected through precedent or B) the government can provide a “compelling
interest” in regulating it. In most cases of the State placing restrictions upon ideological or
political speech, the Court nearly always applies strict scrutiny to the regulation, which
uniformly leads to the dispute being assessed through the lense of the legal maxim identified in
this research. In order to pass these tests of scrutiny, the regulation must be shown to have
been narrowly tailored in order to achieve a compelling government interest.
In broad systematic terms, the Court’s tedious process of weighing the interests of civil
liberties and the State’s interest in regulation against one another, a process that is highlighted
within every case above, has shown to be done most often by first determining the proper level
of scrutiny to apply to the State’s regulation and then assigning the correlating tests and
reasoning processes that have been utilized in past cases that deal with similar contexts or
subject material. As a whole, the Court’s approaches that are highlighted within this study
generally convey the message that State regulation most often has the burden of proof for a
compelling reason to regulate. This well-known practice can be easily identified through the use
of the now commonplace term “compelling government interest”, which was initiated in the
Court and sets the standard that the State must prove, under strict scrutiny, that its interest in
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regulating speech (such as preventing violent uprisings, protecting vulnerable groups,
restricting obscenity, preventing a clear and present danger, etc.) is a matter of necessity rather
than a matter of choice or discretion (Steiner). This practice was utilized within numerous cases
above. Meanwhile, my findings also show that only a small number of the speech or expression
varieties in question within these cases are given such a burden of proof, and they are very
rarely placed under the tests of stringent scrutiny that we see State regulation placed under on
a regular basis.
Ultimately, the majority of these widely varying initial case approaches, though not all,
act as evidence of the Court sponsoring the use of a type of legal maxim within First
Amendment disputes that initially favors the position and value of free speech or expression
over the State’s attempted regulation of it. This evidence directly supports my hypothesis.
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Implications: The Court’s Endorsement of a Free Speech Preferring Legal Maxim

The cases above that don’t act as support for my hypothesis, in which the identified
legal maxim was not utilized by the Court, show us that it is not always a guarantee that the
Court will initially prefer the interests of civil liberties over the interests of the State. Cases like
these have the possibility of setting a dangerous standard in which a “slippery slope”
precedent, per se, could be created. This would make it much easier for the State to regulate
speech or expression moving forward.
As an example, some scholars contend that prior to Schenck (1919), many Americans
viewed the right to free speech and expression as absolute and nearly limitless in nature.
However, the Court’s ruling and Justice Holmes’ written decision in this case, which set forth
the notion that all speech must be evaluated in its context, also caused the possibility of
situations where once Congress would declare war, there would be no further right to debate
the legitimacy or the merits of such a conflict (Daly). The dangers of such a scenario are
obvious: this would not only suppress wartime speech but would also begin the process of
deteriorating the entire constitutional defense system that protects the free exchange of ideas.
Ultimately, cases like Schenck, in which free speech preferring legal maxims were not
utilized, highlight the dangers of its absence. The Supreme Court, by choosing to place the given
speech or expression in a preferred and advantageous position of legal defense, and by placing
the government in a highly scrutinized offensive position in which it must meet certain
standards of its interest of regulation, does two key things. First, it fosters an environment that
endorses and furthers the notion that the Bill of Rights was created and continues to exist in
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order to protect Americans from excessive government rule or regulation. Second, it cultivates
conditions where legitimately dangerous speech can still be struck down as unprotected under
the First Amendment so long as a certain standard of interest is met. Finding and maintaining
this tedious balance point has been and will continue to be no easy feat, and the Court’s future
will likely be defined in part by its shifting methods of pursuing such a position.
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Future Research

Though the above case analyses offer strong evidence that the Court has, more often
than not, chosen to employ a legal maxim which provides preferential consideration to the
Constitution’s interest in protecting disputed speech or expression, my findings also show that
such a maxim has not been put to use in all applicable cases. Inquiry into why, exactly, the
Court has chosen to use it for certain cases and not for others would be the next logical step in
conclusively mapping the Court’s methodology of how it approaches cases within the domain of
the First Amendment.
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